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Group Rebellion in the 1980s
Ryan Dudley and Ross A. Miller
Department of Political Science, Santa Clara University
The authors evaluate the ability of four theoretical approaches to account 
for the occurrence and severity of group rebellion in the 1980s. These expla-
nations for rebellion are state responses and capabilities, relative depriva-
tion, diffusion, and rational actor. Results indicate that relative deprivation 
and rational actor explanations were most important in accounting for the 
occurrence of group rebellion. On the other hand, state responses and ca-
pabilities and relative deprivation were the best explanations for the level 
of group rebellion.
The recent civil war in Zaire demonstrates the devastating consequences of 
ethnic conflict. Unfortunately, Zaire is not an isolated case of internal rebellion. 
Events in Bosnia, Liberia, Rwanda, and Somalia are but a handful of contempo-
rary examples. In fact, a 1995 study identified 56 ongoing internal conflicts (Jong-
man 1995, 22-23, cited in Gurr and Moore 1997, 1). Our objective is to evaluate and 
extend the theoretical and empirical knowledge about the causes of rebellion. We 
offer three contributions.
Previous research has tended to focus on the extent, or level, of violent political 
conflict within a state rather than the occurrence of rebellion. One of the most com-
monly used measures of rebellion is the natural logarithm of deaths from political 
violence within a state during a set period of time, usually 1968 to 1972 or 1973 to 
1977 (e.g., Boswell and Dixon 1990; Muller 1985; Muller and Seligson 1987; Muller 
and Weede 1990, 1994; Schock 1996; Weede 1987). It is important to note that stud-
ies that employ this measure shed very little light on what causes groups to rebel 
in the first place. Instead, they identify factors associated with the severity of rebel-
lion within a state. As we demonstrate below, the distinction between the intensity 
of rebellion and the occurrence of rebellion is important because the factors lead-
ing to the former are not always good predictors of the latter, and vice versa.
Our study also differs from past research by using communal groups with-
in states as the unit of analysis (Gurr 1993a). Previous empirical studies have of-
ten used the nation-state as the unit of analysis, thereby implicitly assuming that 
groups within states respond similarly to conditions that foster or prevent rebel-
lion. Although this assumption is understandable, given the typical focus on the 
volume of conflict, it may be analytically suboptimal. As Lichbach (1994, 15) ex-
plains, “communal relationships beget the communal beliefs that beget communal 
action.” Groups respond differently to changing conditions (e.g., Scott 1976). By fo-
cusing on the group as our unit of analysis, we are able to take into account factors
Authors’ note: We thank Robert Jackman and the anonymous reviewers for helpful com-
ments. Data are available on request.
77
78  DuDley  & Miller in Journal of ConfliCt resolution (February 1998) 42(1) 
such as communal relationships and how these affect the occurrence and extent 
of group rebellion. We are also able to include those state-level variables—for ex-
ample, political institutions—as contextual factors that may influence the propen-
sity of groups to rebel.
Our third contribution is the evaluation of alternative measures of relative de-
privation. Previous studies have overwhelmingly relied on income inequality as a 
measure of relative deprivation.1 We believe that this indicator is limited on both 
conceptual and empirical grounds. Conceptually, relative deprivation is inherent-
ly a psychological (or subjective) political orientation, whereas income inequal-
ity is an objective measure. By not distinguishing between the two, one confus-
es equality with equity (Bronfenbrenner 1973, and also see below).2 Moreover, in-
come inequality is limited conceptually to measuring relative deprivation in terms 
of relative economic well-being, as opposed to other equally valid orientations, in-
cluding political autonomy, political rights, and social and cultural rights. Finally, 
because income inequality is measured with national data, the indicator assumes 
that all groups within a state are affected similarly and will respond similarly to 
the level of income inequality.
To address these issues, we use four separate measures of relative deprivation. 
Each identifies the level of group grievances across four different dimensions: po-
litical autonomy, economics, political rights, and social and cultural rights (Gurr 
1993a). We begin with a brief discussion of the four theoretical approaches to eth-
nic conflict. We then evaluate their explanatory power using a set of 203 cases 
across 80 countries during the 1980s.
THEORETICAL AND EMPIRICAL ISSUES
Four general explanations are often advanced to account for group rebellion: 
state responses and capabilities, diffusion, relative deprivation, and rational actor. 
We discuss each of these in turn.
STATE RESPONSES AND CAPABILITIES
According to Gurr (1993a, 91), “it should ... be obvious that state responses to 
communal grievances are crucial in shaping the course and outcomes of minority 
conflicts.” The fundamental issue here centers on the form of government (Muller 
1985). In particular, the degree to which a state prevents disadvantaged groups 
from expressing their interests and participating in the selection of leaders has of-
ten been hypothesized to influence the propensity of groups to rebel. By far the 
most common specification of this hypothesis is an inverted U-shaped relation-
ship between the repressiveness of the regime and domestic political violence 
(Gurr 1970, 237; see also Muller 1985). At high and low levels of repression, lit-
tle violent activity on the part of groups is expected. In situations of high levels of 
repression, disadvantaged groups are less likely to rebel given the large expected 
costs for participation in a failed rebellion. Cases of low repressiveness should also 
exhibit low levels of rebellion because alternative channels for expressing dissat-
isfaction exist and violence is unnecessary. Rebellious activity is, therefore, asso-
ciated with relatively moderate levels of repression. This hypothesis has enjoyed
1Gurr and Moore (1997), Gurr (1993b), and Lindstrom and Moore (1995) are exceptions.
2We are grateful to Robert Jackman for bringing this to our attention.
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wide-ranging empirical support in studies employing a variety of research de-
signs and sample sizes (e.g., Boswell and Dixon 1990; Muller 1985; Muller and Se-
ligson 1987; Muller and Weede 1990, 1994; Weede 1987). To this end, we construct 
the measure of government type (see below) to take into account the possibility of 
a nonlinear relationship.
DIFFUSION
A second source of internal conflict—one that has received far less attention 
than the others discussed here—is the diffusion of political conflict. The idea that 
cross-national or intranational observations are interdependent (i.e., that rebellion 
by one group is related to rebellion by another) is often known as Galton’s prob-
lem (Ross and Homer 1976). In their study of the diffusion of war, Siverson and 
Starr (1990, 47) provide a nice summary of the theoretical consequences of Gal-
ton’s problem: “while the theory under investigation specifies that onset [of war] is 
being measured, the distinct possibility of diffusion is overlooked. This means that 
the process by which the first two nations in a war begin fighting may be consider-
ably different than the process by which subsequent participants join the war.”
In the case of group rebellion, the diffusion of conflict can occur for a number of 
reasons. For example, a group may mobilize to support the rebellion of a kindred 
group either within that state or in an adjoining state. As evidence of this, Gurr 
(1993a, 133) points to “generations of Kurdish leaders and fighters in Turkey, Syr-
ia, Iraq, and Iran [that] have sustained one another’s political movements.” Diffu-
sion of conflict may also occur because one or more groups believe that the cha-
os and confusion caused by an ongoing rebellion or civil war represent an oppor-
tunity to pursue their own interests (Gurr 1993a, 133). Hill and Rothchild (1986, 
719-20) hypothesize that political conflict by one group can serve as an education-
al tool for other groups: “demonstrations, protests, economic boycotts, and the like 
are very visible political tools that can be easily copied by others for their own pur-
poses.” In their study of the diffusion of political conflict in Africa and the world, 
Hill and Rothchild found that conflict is more likely to diffuse to states with a “re-
cent history of domestic strife,” and in countries “where the mass media come un-
der central political controls, a greater level of media development will slow the 
spread of conflict by offering political elites an important means by which to con-
trol the information available about outside discord” (p. 733). Similarly, a recent 
study by Lindstrom and Moore (1995, 180) found that “protest and rebellion ... 
in neighboring countries influences mobilization and rebellion by ethnic groups.”
To date, most empirical research on ethnic conflict has ignored possible diffu-
sion effects. In the analyses reported below, we assess the degree to which rebel-
lions diffuse both across and within states.
RELATIVE DEPRIVATION
Relative deprivation, as defined by Gurr (1970, 24), is a group’s “perception 
of [the] discrepancy between ... [its] value expectations and... [its] value capabili-
ties.” In other words, it is the difference between what a group believes it should 
receive and what it believes it will receive. One of the most commonly used indi-
cators of relative deprivation is income inequality. The empirical evidence for an 
inequality effect on internal political conflict is, however, mixed. Studies by Si-
gelman and Simpson (1977), Muller (1985), Muller and Seligson (1987), Boswell 
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and Dixon (1990), and Schock (1996) report a significant, positive relationship be-
tween income inequality and political violence. Hardy (1979) and Weede (1981, 
1987), on the other hand, conclude that once a control for the level of economic de-
velopment is introduced, the relationship between income inequality and political 
violence vanishes. This finding is surprising given that many of the studies report-
ed above include a control for the level of economic development.
Leaving these contradictory results to one side, there are at least two other prob-
lems—one conceptual and one empirical—with using income inequality as a mea-
sure of relative deprivation. Conceptually, income inequality and relative depri-
vation are quite different. Income inequality is an inherently objective concept, 
whereas relative deprivation, because it is based on a group’s perception of the 
difference between what it actually receives and what it should receive, is obvi-
ously subjective. Using income inequality to assess the degree to which groups be-
lieve they are relatively deprived, therefore, confounds equality with equity. As 
Bronfenbrenner (1973, 9) explains,
The terms equality and equity are widely confused. Despite their phonetic 
similarity and philological connections, they are quite distinct. The equal-
ity of a distribution of income or wealth is basically a matter of fact and is, 
therefore, basically objective. The equity of the same distribution is basical-
ly a matter of ethical judgment and is, therefore, basically subjective.
Pen (1971, 291) makes a similar point: “good and evil do not speak for themselves.... 
Followers of Christ and Mao-tse-tung, Moslems and humanists, adherents of Ni-
etzsche and of the Sufi movement live in their own world of ideas.” Based on his 
survey of ethical systems, Pen identifies 21 different perceptions about how in-
come should be distributed, ranging from those that stress equality, such as “all to 
get the same” (p. 293) and the Marxist view “incomes from work only” (p. 294), to 
those that stress merit—”deserving professions must be generously remunerated” 
(p. 309) and “special effort must be specially rewarded” (p. 311). Clearly, equali-
ty is not the same thing as equity. Although Bronfenbrenner (1973, 23) concedes 
that there “may be some objective connection, positive or negative, between equi-
ty and equality in the distribution of income and wealth,” he points out that “un-
fortunately, we still do not know what that connection is.” Further, our knowl-
edge of any possible connection has not advanced in the 25 years since Bronfen-
brenner’s statement.
Using income inequality as an indicator of relative deprivation presents empirical 
problems as well. Because it ignores noneconomic sources of relative deprivation, 
it excludes the potential effects of other equally important concerns, such as social 
and cultural rights, political autonomy, and political rights.3 In fact, Gurr (1993a, 
74) found significant regional variation in the types of grievance expressed by 
groups. Although economic grievances tended to be very intense in Latin America
3Even as an indicator of economic relative deprivation, this measure has its limitations. Rus-
sett (1964), for example, found that an inequitable distribution of land as well as the pro-
portion of the population involved in agricultural production had a significant effect on the 
number of deaths from political violence. Recent studies have tended to focus solely on the 
distribution of wealth, as opposed to other equally important factors.
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during the 1980s, they appear to have been of little or no relevance to groups in 
Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union. Political autonomy grievances, on 
the other hand, were concentrated among groups in Asia and North Africa and the 
Middle East, and “grievances about political and social rights were greatest in the 
Middle East, paralleling this region’s high levels of discrimination and inequali-
ties” (Gurr 1993a, 74). The substantial amount of variation in the types of grievanc-
es expressed by groups highlights the difficulties associated with relying on a sin-
gle indicator of relative deprivation.
To overcome the conceptual and empirical difficulties with using income in-
equality as a measure of relative deprivation, we employ four separate measures 
of relative deprivation, based on the dimensions outlined above: political auton-
omy demands, economic grievances, social and cultural grievances, and political 
rights (Gurr 1993a). Each one focuses on the extent to which groups express each 
of the four types of grievances.
RATIONAL ACTOR APPROACHES
Deprivation and discrimination by themselves do not lead directly to rebellion. 
One of the pathbreaking works on the subject of group mobilization is Olson’s 
(1971) The Logic of Collective Action. Olson demonstrates formally that absent selec-
tive incentives (positive and/or negative), large groups will remain latent groups 
and, therefore, will fail to obtain their objectives (see also Lichbach 1994, 1995, 
1996). Coleman (1990, 273) explains the problem in detail:
When a number of self-interested persons are interested in the same out-
come, which can only be brought about by effort that is more costly than 
the benefits it would provide to any of them, then, in the absence of explic-
it organization, there will be a failure to bring about that outcome, even 
though an appropriate allocation of effort would bring it about at a cost to 
each which is less than the benefits each would experience.
This phenomenon, often known as the free-rider problem, has sparked a great 
deal of discussion among group theorists (see, e.g., Lichbach 1994) because it con-
tradicts one of the key assumptions of group theory: that rational, self-interested 
individuals will naturally form groups to achieve a common objective. Olson dem-
onstrates that unless the number of (potential) group members is small or selec-
tive incentives are provided, individuals will not organize and provide a collective 
good. Instead, these groups will remain latent groups.
In addition to providing a theoretical challenge, Olson’s (1971) argument raises 
an empirical puzzle as well. As Coleman (1990, 273) explains,
The puzzle lies in the fact that there are many empirical situations in which 
just the opposite of free-rider activity seems to occur, even though the cir-
cumstances are those in which free riders would be predicted to abound.
Group rebellion represents one of the puzzles identified by Coleman. Why do in-
dividuals join a rebel movement if it is in their interest to be free riders?
Recent research by Lichbach (1994, 1995, 1996), Coleman (1990), and Moore 
(1995) identifies a number of factors that apparently allow large groups to over-
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come the free-rider problem. One factor that is thought to be quite significant is the 
presence of social networks among subgroups of the population. Briefly stated, 
social networks exist when individuals interact with one another. They provide a 
connection among individuals by some common denominator. The networks may 
exist for a variety of reasons, including, for example, racial heritage or religious 
ties. Moore (1995, 445) contends that social networks offer a “promising solution” 
to the problem of accounting for the rebellion of large numbers of people when se-
lective incentives are absent. Social networks “can produce sanctioning systems” 
that penalize those who do not contribute and reward those who do because the 
networks allow individuals to monitor the contributions of others (Moore 1995, 
444). Social networks create responsibility and accountability on the part of indi-
viduals, thereby providing a mechanism by which the collective action problem 
faced by large groups can be overcome.
Unfortunately, to date we have “no empirical analyses of Coleman’s account” 
(Moore 1995, 445). In this article, we provide an empirical assessment of the effect 
of social networks on the occurrence and severity of group rebellion.
DATA
In the statistical models estimated below, the unit of analysis is drawn from 
Phase I of Gurr’s (1993a) Minorities at Risk Project (MARP). In the MARP, Gurr 
identifies 233 politically active communal groups, defined as “psychological com-
munities: groups whose core members share a distinctive and enduring collective 
identify based on cultural traits and lifeways that matter to them and to others 
with whom they interact” (p. 3). To be included, each group had to meet the fol-
lowing criteria. First, as of 1990, each group must have had at least 100,000 mem-
bers or have constituted at least 1% of the population of the country in which they 
resided, and the country must have had a total population of 1 million or more as 
of 1985. Second, each group in the study “collectively suffers, or benefits from, sys-
tematic discriminatory treatment vis-à-vis other groups in a state” (p. 6). Although 
inclusion of a group that benefits from systematic discrimination (e.g., the Serbs 
of Yugoslavia or the Chinese of Malaysia) may seem inappropriate, these groups 
“mobilize in response to challenges by other groups (as the Serbs have done) and, 
when not in power, often are subject to discriminatory restrictions (as are the Ma-
laysian Chinese)” (p. 8). A final important coding rule in the MARP is that each 
group was “the focus of political mobilization and action in defense or promotion 
of its self-defined interests at some time between 1945 and 1989” (p. 7).
MEASURES
Two indicators of rebellion are used as dependent variables, and both are based 
on research by Gurr (1993a, 352-64). The first indicates the extent, or level, of group 
rebellion in the 1980s. Gurr constructed this measure by summing two Guttman 
scale scores of rebellions from 1980 to 1984 and from 1985 to 1989, each of which 
varied between 0 and 5, with the following activities associated with each value 
(Gurr 1993a, 95):
0 = no rebellion reported
1 = political banditry, sporadic terrorism, and unsuccessful coups
2 = campaigns of terrorism, successful coups
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3 = small-scale guerrilla activity
4 = large-scale guerrilla activity
5 = protracted civil war4
The summary measure for the 1980s, therefore, varies between 0 and 10. Of the 
203 groups included in the analyses below, approximately 37% engaged in some 
form of rebellion.
The second measure of group rebellion captures whether a group rebelled dur-
ing the 1980s. It takes on the value of 0 for cases in which the group did not rebel 
and 1 for those situations in which a group rebelled (at any level).
Two measures are used to assess state responses and capabilities. Both are based 
on an 11-point autocracy measure in the Polity II data for 1980 (Gurr, Jaggers, and 
Moore 1989).5 The Polity II autocracy indicator is an additive, weighted 11-point 
scale, coded the with 0 representing the lowest level of autocracy and 10 represent-
ing the highest level of autocracy. Autocracy is defined as the degree to which state 
political institutions restrict or suppress competitive political participation. Gurr, 
Jaggers, and Moore (1989, 37) use five indicators to construct the scale: the com-
petitiveness of political participation, the regulation of participation, the openness 
and competitiveness of executive recruitment, and constraints on the chief execu-
tive. We use 1980 as the base year because of the potential confounding effects that 
rebellion can have on the level of autocracy. In the face of rebellion, a state may be-
come more repressive, thereby creating a problem of endogeneity for the autocra-
cy measure.
Two dummy variables are used to measure the level of autocracy. The first, low 
autocracy, is coded as 1 when the state received a score of 3 or less on the Polity II 
measure and 0 otherwise.6 The second indicator, medium autocracy, is coded as 1 
for states receiving a score of between 4 and 6 on the Polity II measure and 0 oth-
erwise.7 By using two separate measures, we are able to capture the hypothesized 
inverted U-shaped relationship between autocracy and rebellion. Both indicators 
will be included in the analyses reported below. Therefore, the corresponding es-
timates will be comparing the rebellion rates and severity of rebellion of groups 
living in states with low or medium levels of autocracy with those groups living in 
states with relatively high levels of autocracy.
Taken together, these two variables represent the political context within which 
groups live. If the inverted U-shaped hypothesis is correct, then groups that re-
side in states with high or low levels of autocracy should be reluctant to rebel. On 
the other hand, groups in states with medium levels of autocracy should be more
4The original indicator includes values of 6 (other types of activity), 7 (civil or revolutionary 
war not specifically or mainly concerned with group issues), and 8 (involvement in interna-
tional war not specifically or mainly concerned with group issues). For the 1980s summary 
measure, Gurr (1993a, 95) recoded values of 6 as 3, and values of 7 and 8 as 4.
5We also considered using the Polity II measure of democracy. However, for theoretical and 
empirical reasons, we elected to use the measure of autocracy. On theoretical grounds, Gurr 
(1970, 237) is quite explicit in highlighting the relationship between the balance between the 
coercive control of (potential) dissidents and the regime and the consequence for the magni-
tude of political violence. Empirically, the democracy measure posed problems as well. Al-
though both the autocracy and the democracy scales are bimodal, the democracy scale has a 
much larger grouping of values on the lower and upper values. In fact, when we coded the
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likely to use rebellion (and at higher levels) as a means of altering the status quo.
Two variables are employed to represent diffusion effects. Both are based on 
Gurr’s rebellion variable discussed above. The first measures the extent to which 
groups in border nations, or nations across less than 200 miles of open water,8 re-
belled during the 1980s (Gurr 1993a, 352-64). It takes on the value of 1 for cases in 
which a neighboring group received a score of 8 or higher on Gurr’s measure of 
rebellion and 0 otherwise.9 The second indicator of diffusion, intranational rebel-
lion, is designed to assess whether assess whether rebellions diffuse across groups 
within nations. It assumes the value of 1 if one or more groups (besides the group 
of interest) engaged in rebellious activity and 0 otherwise. As with the cross-na-
tional indicator, the activity had to be coded as 8 or higher. All else being equal, 
groups residing in states in the midst of rebellion and those near states experienc-
ing rebellion should be more likely than other groups to rebel.
Gurr (1993a) has collected data on four different items based on the types of 
group grievance that are ideally suited to be measures of relative deprivation: po-
litical autonomy, political rights, economic rights, and social and cultural rights. 
Each indicator represents a summary measure of the salience of issues associated 
with each of the four dimensions for each group in the survey. For example, Gurr’s 
scale of political autonomy is based on the salience (0 = not salient, 1 = lesser sig-
nificance, 2 = issue is highly salient) of four issues: (1) the group expresses a gen-
eral concern with political autonomy, (2) the group demands union with a kin-
dred group elsewhere, (3) the group seeks independence from the state, and (4) 
the group demands regional autonomy. The greater the salience of each individu-
al issue to the group, the greater the overall score.
In the analyses reported below, autonomy grievance is an ordinal scale, with 0 
representing low levels of relative deprivation and 3 representing high levels of
democracy scale using the same rules applied to the autocracy measure below, only 16 cases 
(about 8%) were included in the middle category. In contrast, 44 cases (about 20%) were in-
cluded in the medium autocracy category.
6This coding rule is admittedly arbitrary. For purposes of comparison, we reestimated the re-
sults reported below using two different cutoff points. In the first, we recoded low autocra-
cy to take on a value of 1 for those cases receiving a score of 4 or lower on the original autoc-
racy scale. The results are even more impressive than those reported below: medium level of 
autocracy was significant across all model variations reported in Tables 2 and 4. We also re-
estimated the model, with low autocracy coded as 1 for cases receiving a score of 2 or lower. 
The results were virtually identical to those reported in Tables 2 and 4.
7The cutoff of 6 for the upper threshold of medium level of autocracy is necessary on empiri-
cal grounds. According to Rousseau et al. (1996, 519), the autocracy index was “created even 
when one or more of the subcomponents are missing (e.g., Cuba 1959-1986). This implies, 
for example, that for some countries the autocracy index varies from 0 to 10, while for oth-
er countries it only varies from 0 to 7.” This may account for the fact that a preponderance of 
the cases (68) used in the analyses below have a value of 7 on the autocracy scale. Therefore, 
to avoid this coding problem, cases receiving a score of 7 or higher on the autocracy measure 
are assumed to be highly autocratic.
8This coding rule is based on the one used by Siverson and Starr (1990).
9We use 8 as a cutoff to ensure that the level of conflict in a neighboring state (or by another 
group within a state) is sufficiently visible and active throughout both periods (1980 to 1984 
and 1985 to 1989). A coding of 8 guarantees that, minimally, there was small-scale guerrilla 
war carried out by a bordering  nation or by another group within the state.
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deprivation;10 similarly, economic grievance varies from 0 to 5, political grievance 
ranges from 0 to 5, and social and cultural grievances are scored between 0 and 6 
(see Gurr 1993a for more details on the coding rules).
On each dimension of relative deprivation, as the score increases, so does the 
intensity of grievance. Thus, each measure represents an ordinal scale of relative 
deprivation and should be positively related to the occurrence and severity of re-
bellion.
Following Hardy (1979) and Weede (1981, 1987), we also control for the lev-
el of wealth within the state. The overall wealth of a state may affect the degree 
to which groups feel they are deprived (although obviously not identically). Our 
measure is the 1980 per capita real gross domestic product based on version 5.6 of 
the Summers and Heston (1991) purchasing power data set. As with the autocracy 
measure, we use 1980 as the base year because of the possible biasing effects that 
rebellion could have on the wealth of the state. Because of the skewed distribution 
of the indicator, the estimates reported below use the natural logarithm of per cap-
ita real gross domestic product.
To evaluate the explanatory power of the rational actor approach, two indi-
cators are used to represent the presence of social networks: the coherence and 
the concen- tration of each of the groups in the study, both of which are from 
Gurr (1993a, 326-39). The first indicator, coherence, is a 5-point ordinal scale of 
group coherence, with 1 representing weak group identification and 5 indicating 
strong group identification. The second indicator, concentration, is a 6-point ordi-
nal scale, with 1 indicating that the group is “widely dispersed in most urban and 
rural areas” and 6 representing a group that “is concentrated in one or several ad-
joining regions” (Gurr 1993a, 326). All else being equal, groups with high levels of 
coherence and/or concentration should be more likely to have strong social net-
works than groups with low levels of coherence and concentration. In the models 
estimated below, both variables are hypothesized to have a positive, significant ef-
fect on the occurrence and level of group rebellion.
We also include a control for advantaged groups, defined by Gurr (1993a, 326) 
as groups that enjoy political and/or economic advantages. This indicator takes 
on a value of 1 for groups considered to be advantaged and 0 otherwise. All else 
being equal, advantaged groups should be less likely than disadvantaged groups 
to rebel.
The resulting data set includes information on 203 groups and the states in 
which they live. Table 1 reports summary statistics on the dependent and indepen-
Also, to ensure that our analysis was not affected by temporal problems—that is, that the 
conflict by one group that apparently “caused” another group to rebel actually occurred af-
ter the latter rebelled—we checked each case of suspected diffusion using a variety of his-
torical sources.
10In its original form, the indicator of autonomy grievance had a maximum value of 4. How-
ever, there were very few cases that received a score of 4, leading to a skewed distribution. 
To correct for this, we recoded the variable, with 3 representing a score of 3 or higher on the 
original Gurr measure. Nonnormal distributions were also found for the economic and polit-
ical rights measures. Economic grievances and political rights were recoded from their origi-
nal 9-point scales to 6-point scales to correct for the nonnormal distributions (i.e., like auton-
omy grievance, both were positively skewed).
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dent variables.11 From this table, we note that, on average, groups rebel about 
37% of the time, with a level of rebellion of 1.69. Substantively, a score of 1.69 im-
plies activity such as political banditry, coups (both successful and unsuccessful), 
and campaigns of terrorism. Furthermore, about one third (36%) of the groups in 
our sample reside in states with relatively low levels of autocracy, and 20% live in 
states with medium levels of autocracy. This suggests that roughly half (44%) of 
the communal groups are located in states that are highly autocratic.
Surprisingly, about 40% of the groups are located in nations bordering a state 
that experienced group rebellion during the 1980s. If we break this figure down 
by the regional groupings identified by Gurr (1993a) (Western democracies and 
Japan, Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, Asia, North Africa and the 
Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin American and the Caribbean), we find 
that groups in three regions were especially susceptible to diffusion: Eastern Eu-
rope and the former Soviet Union (62.5% of groups witnessed rebellion in a bor-
dering nation), Asia (58.1%), and North Africa and the Middle East (64.5%). In 
contrast, only 8.3% of the groups in the Western democracies and Japan were can-
didates for the diffusion of conflict across nations. The figures for Sub-Saharan Af-
rica and Latin America and the Caribbean are also low-25.6% and 24.1%, respec-
tively. For the diffusion of conflict across groups within states, only 15% of the 203 
groups received a score of 1. Thus, few groups witnessed the rebellion of one or 
more groups within their borders.
Table 1
Summary Statistics for the Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable                M     SD     Minimum    Maximum
Dependent variables
  Occurrence of rebellion        0.37    0.49      0      1
  Level of rebellion          1.69    2.88      0      10
State response/capabilities
  Low autocracy           0.36    0.48      0      1
  Medium autocracy          0.20    0.40      0      1
Diffusion
  Cross-national           0.41    0.49      0      1
  Intranational            0.15    0.36      0      1
Relative deprivation
  Real gross domestic product (logged)   7.67    1.06      5.78     9.64
  Economic grievance         1.88    1.72      0      5
  Autonomy grievance         0.92    1.03      0      3
  Political grievance          2.11    1.64      0      5
  Social grievance           1.77    1.64      0      6
Rational actor
  Coherence             3.75    1.13      1      5
  Concentration            4.87    1.74      1      6
Note: N= 203.
11For space considerations, we do not report the correlation matrix. However, it is unlikely 
that multicollinearity is a problem in any of the analyses reported below because the high-
est correlation between any of the independent variables was .55 (economic grievances and 
political rights grievances).
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Because the variable for wealth is the natural logarithm of per capita real gross 
domestic product (RGDP), the summary statistics are not intuitively meaning-
ful. Based on the figures from the original (untransformed) measure of per capita 
RGDP (not reported in Table 1), the median purchasing power of the states in the 
sample was $1,941, with $322 and $15,295 being the minimum and maximum val-
ues, respectively.
Looking at the four measures of relative deprivation, political grievances tend to 
be the most salient issue across the 203 groups in the study, followed by economic 
and social grievances and political autonomy grievances. These results underscore 
the importance of viewing relative deprivation as a multidimensional concept and 
of expanding the focus to include noneconomic indicators as well.
In terms of characteristics, the groups in our study show relatively high levels of 
coherence (3.75 out of a possible maximum score of 5) and concentration (4.87 out 
of a possible maximum of 6).
ANALYSIS
PREDICTING THE OCCURRENCE OF REBELLION
We begin by assessing the ability of the four general approaches described above 
to account for the occurrence of group rebellion. Because of the dichotomous na-
ture of the measure of the occurrence of group rebellion, probit analysis is used to 
evaluate the explanatory power of the independent variables (Aldrich and Nelson 
1984). Table 2 presents the results from a series of models used to assess the effects 
of the four sources of group rebellion discussed above.
Each of the columns (2 through 5) represents the results from a model using a 
different indicator of group grievance (autonomy, economic, political, or social 
and cultural grievances, respectively). The models are identical in all other re-
spects.
The estimates in columns 2 through 5 provide some support for the inverted U-
shaped hypothesis regarding the relationship between the level of autocracy and 
the occurrence of group rebellion. In all cases, the magnitude of the coefficient for 
medium autocracy exceeds the corresponding estimate for low autocracy. In two 
of the models, the indicator of medium autocracy is statistically significant, sug-
gesting that the groups living in states with medium levels of autocracy are more 
likely than groups in highly autocratic states to rebel. In no cases is the estimate 
from low level of autocracy distinguishable from zero on statistical grounds.
These results are similar to those reported by Gurr (1993b), Gurr and Moore 
(1997), and Lindstrom and Moore (1995) that state responses and capabilities influ-
ence the probability of rebellion. An important difference between the estimates 
obtained in previous studies and the ones we report here is that past studies eval-
uated the linear effect of political institutions on the level of rebellion, rather than 
attempting to isolate a nonlinear relationship between state responses and capa-
bilities and the probability of rebellion.
Diffusion (both cross-national and intranational) has little, if any, significant ef-
fect on the probability that a group will rebel. Although all of the estimates for 
both indicators are correctly signed (positive), none are statistically significant us-
ing conventional standards. This is somewhat surprising, given that Gurr (1993b), 
Gurr and Moore (1997), and Lindstrom and Moore (1995) all report that the level 
of rebellion undertaken by a minority group at risk is positively influenced by the 
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presence of ongoing conflicts in neighboring states. One possible explanation for 
the differences is the coding rule used by Gurr and Moore. The Gurr and Moore 
diffusion measure is based on the “occurrence of similar rebellions elsewhere in a 
region” (p. 5). It is, therefore, considerably more broad than the measures we em-
ploy, which require a summary rebellion of 8 or higher by another group in the 
state (for intranational diffusion) or a group in a neighboring state (for cross-na-
tional diffusion).
Our measures of relative deprivation and the control for per capita wealth, on the 
other hand, enjoy relatively strong support. In all versions of the model, per capita 
wealth is negatively related to the occurrence of group rebellion, and it is statisti-
cally significant in three of the models (models 1, 2, and 4). Looking at the different 
estimates for group grievances, we note that all of them are correctly signed. How-
ever, only two types of group grievances—autonomy and political rights—are sig-
Table 2
Predicting the Occurrence of Rebellion Using State Capabilities,
Diffusion, Relative Deprivation, and Rational Actor Approaches
               Model 1:     Model 2:    Model 3:    Model 4:
               Autonomy    Economic   Political    Social
Independent Variable        Grievance    Grievance   Grievance   Grievance
State response/capabilities
  Low autocracy         0.22      0.11     0.10     0.20
               (0.89)      (0.45)     (0.40)     (0.84)
  Medium autocracy        0.44      0.50*     0.46     0.54*
               (1.39)      (1.70)     (1.53)     (1.84)
Diffusion
  Cross-national         0.10      0.33     0.30     0.25
               (0.45)      (1.47)     (1.34)     (1.11)
  Intranational          0.04      0.39     0.36     0.39
               (0.10)      (1.13)     (1.05)     (1.14)
Relative deprivation
  Real gross domestic        -0.31*      -0.20*     -0.17     -0.20*
   product (log)        (2.55)      (1.79)     (1.48)     (1.78)
  Grievance           0.58*      0.10     0.23*     0.03
               (5.14)      (1.62)     (3.59)     (0.65)
Rational actor
  Coherence           0.17*      0.28*     0.29*     0.25*
               (1.69)      (2.88)     (2.97)     (2.68)
  Concentration          0.05      0.13*     0.14*     0.13*
               (0.65)      (1.98)     (2.07)     (2.01)
Control
  Advantaged group        -1.07*      -1.17*     -1.06*     -1.21*
               (2.74)      (3.20)     (2.83)     (3.32)
N                 203         202       203        203
Log-likelihood           -95.78      -108.43     -103.39     -110.02
Chi-square            76.91*      50.67*     61.68*     48.42*
Percentage correctly classified    74.38      73.27     73.40     76.35
Proportional reduction in error    0.32      0.29     0.29     0.37
Note: Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates; z scores are in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, one-tailed.
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nificant using conventional standards. The estimates for economic grievances and 
social and cultural grievances are correctly signed but not statistically significant. 
These results highlight the importance of viewing relative deprivation as a sub-
jective, multidimensional concept that should not be reduced to a single, objec-
tive indicator such as income inequality. Further, the fact that economic grievanc-
es have no effect is noteworthy, given that many analyses of relative deprivation 
have centered on income inequality. Our results are consistent with those reported 
by Gurr (1993b) but differ somewhat from those found by Gurr and Moore (1997) 
and Lindstrom and Moore (1995), who suggest that the link between grievances 
and rebellion is indirect (i.e., the level of grievance influences the likelihood of mo-
bilization, which, in turn, affects the extent of rebellion).
The estimates of the effect of group characteristics on rebellion are especially 
striking. The indicator of coherence has the correct sign (positive) and is signifi-
cant in all four variations of the model. The estimates for group concentration, al-
though not as strong, are nonetheless pronounced. In each of the different models, 
the coefficient estimate is positive, and the effect is statistically significant in three 
of the four variations (models 2, 3, and 4). These results provide strong support 
for the arguments of Coleman (1990) and Moore (1995) and are consistent with the 
empirical findings of Gurr (1993b) and Gurr and Moore (1997) that social networks 
can help solve the collective action problem faced by large groups.
The model does a reasonably good job of correctly classifying the cases. On av-
erage, 74% of the 203 cases are correctly classified. These results should be viewed 
with some caution, however, because of the uneven distribution of cases across the 
dependent variable (Gartner 1997). Of the groups in the study, 63% did not rebel 
during the 1980s. Thus, predicting no rebellion for each group would still classify 
cases with 63% accuracy. A measure that does not suffer the same weakness is the 
proportional reduction in error (PRE). PRE is calculated by (1) subtracting the num-
ber of cases correctly classified by the model by the number of cases in the modal 
category and (2) dividing this figure by the number of cases in the modal catego-
ry. The last row in Table 2 presents the PRE across each of the four models. Over-
all, the results are quite strong. On average, the amount of error associated with al-
ways predicting the modal category declines by 32%, a significant improvement.
A related question centers on the substantive effects of each variable in the mod-
el on the probability of group rebellion. Because the coefficient estimates generat-
ed by probit are not intuitively meaningful, Table 3 presents the percentage shifts 
in the cumulative normal probability distribution for selected values of key inde-
pendent variables (see Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980, Appendix C, for a discus-
sion of this procedure). The estimates in Table 3 are obtained by calculating the 
base probability of rebellion, which is the likelihood of rebellion with all variables 
held constant. Then, specific values of key independent variables are substituted 
(one at a time) to assess how much the probability of a rebellion changes across 
values of that variable. Because not all variables were statistically significant across 
all models, we elected to present results for variables if they were significant in 
any two of the four models (in the case of each of the separate grievance vari-
ables, we calculated percentage shifts for all that were significant). A second rule 
was that for those variables that were significant in two or more models, we used 
the base model in which the variable of interest had the smallest (absolute value) 
coefficient estimate, thereby making the evaluation as conservative as possible.
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For example, we note that the estimates for the effect of group coherence on the 
probability of rebellion are significant across all four models. Thus, it meets the 
first criterion (at least two models produced significant results) and is, therefore, 
included in Table 3. The next question is, Which one of the four coefficient esti-
mates should be used for the calculations in Table 3? Comparing across the four 
columns, we note that the coefficient estimates vary between a low of 0.17 (mod-
el 1) to a high of 0.29 (model 3). Based on our second coding rule, we therefore use 
the model 1 estimate of 0.17 because it is the smallest of the four coefficients. Ta-
ble 3 presents the base probability from each model used to calculate the shifts in 
the cumulative normal probability distribution in column 2, the probability of re-
bellion when one of the variables is constrained to a particular value in column 3, 
and the change in the likelihood of rebellion over the baseline probability in col-
umn 4.
The effect of level of autocracy is consistent with the inverted U-shaped hypoth-
esis. When autocracy is constrained to a medium level, the probability of group 
rebellion increases by 9.84 percentage points, from the base of 37.42 to 47.26. Al-
though the estimate for low levels of autocracy increases the probability of rebel-
lion by about 4 percentage points (3.78), it is important to keep in mind that the ef-
fect was not distinguishable from zero on statistical grounds. Low autocracy is in-
cluded in Table 3 only for purposes of comparison with the estimate for medium 
levels of autocracy.
Table 3
Predicting the Occurrence of Rebellion: Shifts in the Cumulative
Normal Probability Distribution for Key Independent Variables
                  Baseline    Probability    Change
Variable                Probability   of Rebellion   from Baseline
Autocracy               37.42
  Low                       41.20      3.78
  Medium                      47.26      9.84
Per capita real gross domestic product (log) 37.82
  25th percentile                   43.31      5.49
  50th percentile                   38.21      0.39
  75th percentile                   31.41      -6.41
Autonomy grievance           37.42
  Low (1)                      36.87      -0.55
  Medium (2)                     56.81      19.39
  High (3)                      75.13      37.71
Political rights grievance         37.55
  Low (1)                     28.94      -8.64
  Medium (3)                    42.99      5.44
  High (5)                     57.98      20.43
Group coherence            37.42
  Low (1)                     25.07      -12.35
  Medium (3)                    33.31      -4.11
  High (5)                     42.53      5.11
Group concentration           37.82
  Low (2)                     26.01      -11.81
  Medium (4)                    33.59      -4.23
  High (6)                     41.91      4.09
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Turning to per capita wealth, we notice a modest, but nonetheless pronounced, 
effect. When we constrain per capita wealth to the 25th percentile (i.e., 75% of the 
groups live in wealthier states), the probability of rebellion decreases by roughly 
5½ percentage points. In contrast, groups in wealthier states (75th percentile) are 
about 6½  percentage points less likely to rebel.
The level of autonomy demands has a strong net effect on the likelihood of re-
bellion. When this variable is constrained to a low level (1), the probability of re-
bellion is slightly less than the baseline probability (36.87 compared with 37.42, 
respectively). On the other hand, when the value of autonomy grievance is con-
strained to its highest value (3), the chances of group rebellion increase to 75.13%, 
a 37.71 point increase! The results for political rights are also striking. When polit-
ical rights is held constant at a low level (1), the probability of rebellion decreas-
es by 8.64 points to 28.94%. In contrast, when the same indicator is constrained to 
its highest value (5), the likelihood of rebellion increases by 20.43 points, to about 
60% (57.98%). Taken together, these estimates provide strong support for the no-
tion that relative deprivation influences rebellion. Moreover, the results reinforce 
the pointmade earlier that relative deprivation is a multidimensional concept, and 
at least two of the dimensions—autonomy and political rights—have significant 
effects on the behavior of groups.
Moving down to our measures of social networks—coherence and concentra-
tion— we find that they have similar effects on the probability of rebellion. When 
group coherence is held at a low value (1), the likelihood of conflict reduces by 
12.35 points to roughly 25%. On the other hand, highly coherent groups have 
about a 43% chance of rebellion (an increase of about 5 points). Similarly, when 
group concentration is constrained to a low value (2), the likelihood of conflict 
drops by about 12 points (11.81). Highly concentrated groups, on the other hand, 
are about 4 percentage points more likely to rebel.
Based on the analyses reported above, we find significant evidence of an invert-
ed U-shaped effect of autocracy on rebellion. In all of the models, the indicators 
are correctly signed, and in two out of the four models, medium levels of autoc-
racy had a statistically significant effect on the probability of group rebellion. The 
strongest effects appear to come from the indicators of relative deprivation. Both 
autonomy and political rights grievances have a pronounced effect on the occur-
rence of rebellion. Finally, we also have modest but sustained support for the hy-
pothesis that social networks can help solve the collective action problem. The 
characteristics of a group— in terms of its coherence and concentration—affect the 
probability of rebellion.
PREDICTING THE INTENSITY OF REBELLION
We turn now to the second portion of the analysis section: evaluating the abili-
ty of the independent variables to account for the level of group rebellion. Because 
the dependent variable is skewed to the right, tobit analysis will be used to assess 
the relative explanatory power of the four different models discussed above.12 In 
Table 4, we report estimates from models using the same format as in Table 2.
Comparing Tables 2 and 4, one of the most important similarities is the effect of
12We also estimated the models using ordinary least squares regression. The results were vir-
tually identical to those reported above.
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autocracy on the severity of rebellion. The results in Table 4 provide even more 
support for the inverted U-shaped hypothesis. In every variation of the model, 
the estimate for medium level of autocracy is positive and significant, whereas the 
corresponding estimate for low level of autocracy, although correctly signed, is in-
distinguishable from zero on statistical grounds.
These results are somewhat surprising, given that Scarritt and McMillan (1995) 
(who also use the Phase I data set) report a positive and significant relationship be-
tween the level of democracy (measured in 1986) and the level of group rebellion 
during the 1980s. Of course, these differences may be due to the fact that Scarritt 
and McMillan restrict their attention to Africa. On the other hand, as we mention 
above, our results are generally consistent with those reported by Gurr (1993b), 
Gurr and Moore (1997), and Lindstrom and Moore (1995), who found a significant 
negative effect of democracy on the level of rebellion.
The results for cross-national diffusion are similar to those we found predicting 
the occurrence of rebellion-no significant effect-and once again are somewhat sur-
Table 4
Predicting the Level of Rebellion Using State Capabilities, Diffusion,
Relative Deprivation, and Rational Actor Approaches
               Model 1:    Model 2:    Model 3.    Model 4:
               Autonomy   Economic   Political    Social
Independent Variable        Grievance   Grievance   Grievance   Grievance
State response/capabilities
  Low autocracy         0.31     0.24     0.14     0.32
               (0.76)     (0.55)     (0.33)     (0.72)
  Medium autocracy        1.18*     1.41*     1.23*     1.47*
               (2.31)     (2.56)     (2.30)     (2.69)
Diffusion
  Cross-national         -0.43     0.01     -0.03     -0.14
               (1.11)     (0.04)     (0.06)     (0.34)
  Intranational          0.67     1.24*     1.20*     1.22*
               (1.12)     (1.97)     (1.98)     (1.93)
Relative deprivation
  Real gross domestic        -0.81*     -0.69*     -0.61*     -0.70*
   product (log)        (4.09)     (3.26)     (2.93)     (3.28)
  Grievance           1.04*     0.14     0.42*     0.12
               (5.57)     (1.21)     (3.78)     (0.96)
Rational actor
  Coherence           -0.05     0.21     0.21     0.18
               (0.28)     (1.23)     (1.26)     (1.05)
  Concentration          0.06     0.17     0.19*     0.19*
               (0.52)     (1.54)     (1.77)     (1.65)
Controls
  Advantaged group        -1.52*     -1.92*     -1.62*     -1.94*
               (2.87)     (3.37)     (2.93)     (3.41)
N               203      202      203      203
Chi-square            86.55*     58.88*     71.51*     58.61*
Log-likelihood         -459.42    -471.07    -466.94    -473.39
Note: Numbers in the table are coefficient estimates; t ratios are in parentheses.
*p < 0.05, one-tailed.
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prising given the findings reported by other studies (e.g., Gurr 1993b; Gurr and 
Moore 1997; Lindstrom and Moore 1995). On the other hand, intranational diffu-
sion is correctly signed and statistically significant in three of the four variations 
of the model. Although it is striking that the effect is found predicting the level of 
rebellion but not the occurrence of rebellion, these results should be viewed with 
caution. The effect that is attributed to a diffusion process may simply be a result 
of the fact that the presence of rebellion has weakened the repressive capacity of 
the state. One possible avenue of future research is, therefore, to explore this find-
ing in more depth.
The estimates for the indicators of grievance and wealth are very similar to those 
predicting the occurrence of rebellion. Per capita wealth has a negative, significant 
effect on the severity of rebellion across all variations of the model. Similarly, two 
indicators of relative deprivation—autonomy grievance and political grievance—
have a significant effect on the severity of rebellion. These latter results are con-
sistent with those reported by Scarritt and McMillan (1995) and Gurr (1993b). Al-
though Lindstrom and Moore (1995) and Gurr and Moore (1997) do not find a sig-
nificant direct relationship between grievances and rebellion, they do report an in-
direct effect.
Group characteristics, which played a powerful role in predicting the occur-
rence of rebellion, have less influence on the level of rebellion. The estimate for 
the coherence of a group, although correctly signed in three of the four models, is 
actually negative in model 1, and none of the estimates is statistically significant. 
These results are similar to those reported by Scarritt and McMillan (1995, 336), 
who found no evidence of a systematic relationship between group coherence and 
the level of rebellion.
On the other hand, there is limited support for the effect of group concentra-
tion on the extent of rebellion. In each of the models, the effect is positive, and 
in the last two models, the effect is significant. Of course, the fact that social net-
works have such a pronounced effect on the probability of rebellion but have a 
much weaker effect on the level of rebellion is not surprising. After all, the collec-
tive action problem does not address the intensity with which groups pursue ob-
jectives (or with what means), which, in this case, represent things such as coups, 
civil war, and political banditry; rather, the collective action literature addresses 
whether a group will form to achieve a particular goal.
CONCLUSIONS
Our goal was to evaluate the ability of state responses and capabilities, diffu-
sion, relative deprivation, and rational actor to account for group rebellion in the 
1980s. Overall, our results indicate that relative deprivation and rational actor ex-
planations were more important in accounting for the occurrence of group rebel-
lion. On the other hand, state responses and capabilities and relative deprivation 
were the better explanations of the level of group rebellion.
These results are somewhat surprising, given that previous studies that used the 
MARP (Gurr and Moore 1997; Lindstrom and Moore 1995) do not find any direct 
link between their measures of relative deprivation and group rebellion (although, 
as we mention above, they do report an indirect effect). Our estimates indicate a 
pronounced effect of political autonomy grievances and political rights grievanc-
es on the occurrence and severity of group rebellion. Most likely, these differences 
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are due to the fact that both Gurr and Moore (1997, 11) and Lindstrom and Moore 
(1995, 185) employ a composite measure of grievances based on economic griev-
ances, social grievances, and political rights. The estimates we obtain suggest that 
it is more useful to treat grievances separately. Moreover, given that both Gurr 
and Moore (1997) and Lindstrom and Moore (1995) find a significant indirect ef-
fect of relative deprivation on the severity of rebellion by taking into account the 
ability of a group to mobilize, an interesting avenue for future research would be 
to examine the linkages of the separate types of grievances-both direct and indi-
rect-on the occurrence and severity of group rebellion.
More generally, with the release of Phase III of the MARP, we agree with Elli-
na and Moore (1990, 275) that it will be especially useful to determine if state re-
sponses and capabilities, relative deprivation, and social networks have the same 
effect on the occurrence and severity of rebellion over time. Most of the studies of 
group rebellion are cross-sectional, and although much insight can be gained from 
using a cross-sectional approach (Jackman 1985), our results suggest that it is im-
portant to focus on group-specific as well as nation-specific factors that affect the 
occurrence and severity of group rebellion.
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